Effective January 5, 2026, Ming Ta will progressively adjust the production processes, supply arrangements, and investment matters related to raw materials and upstream and downstream partner companies. Existing achievements will be gradually transferred to other developing and developed countries. Taiwan will be retained solely as a business operations and inspection hub. All other precision manufacturing, processing, and secondary raw material production will be progressively divested, reinvested, or relocated to countries that comply with international treaties and the global commercial trade order.
As a legally registered company in Taipei City, in addition to fulfilling tax obligations and bearing all legally required corporate costs, it is essential to have complete institutional support and backing from relevant government authorities. As the political and economic center of Taiwan, Taipei City should, in principle, possess an open and efficient governance system. However, in recent years, when proposing business blueprints to expand operations in Taipei, we have repeatedly encountered a highly rigid administrative structure, outdated legal frameworks, and a lack of supporting measures within the Taipei City Government.
Particularly against the backdrop of rapid changes in the international mineral and raw materials supply chain and increasingly stringent regulatory requirements, long-standing governance deficiencies have created structural risks for foreign-invested enterprises. The lack of transparency in review mechanisms and arbitrary decision-making have caused Taipei City’s governance to drift away from international treaties and increasingly clash with multinational supply chains. Although bureaucratic self-protection has existed since ancient times, systemic issues—where rigid regulations and opaque processes allow decisions to be made by a very small group—have created significant barriers for Taiwanese enterprises seeking to build brands, expand markets, and engage in cross-border transactions.
As the saying goes, “Those who understand the times are heroes; good birds choose suitable trees to roost.” Honest advice is often unpleasant to hear.
The rigidity of the administrative system and outdated laws have severely affected our company’s ability to establish production bases and experimental facilities in Taiwan. Despite choosing Taipei, the capital, as our development location, we have faced inefficiency and unsubstantiated criticism stemming from a lack of administrative professionalism. According to official meeting records, the Taipei City Government itself has acknowledged that “internationalization and government efficiency… are areas that need strengthening,” and that past investment promotion efforts were “insufficiently proactive and relatively conservative.”
In other words, while Taipei recognizes its advantages in talent, ecosystems, and soft power, it also admits that administrative efficiency remains inadequate. This implies that current procedures are overly complex, bureaucratic practices are outdated, and institutional frameworks have failed to keep pace with global investment trends. Multiple studies have also pointed out that local administration in Taiwan is often constrained by entrenched procedures and outdated regulations, resulting in low efficiency and limited adaptability. For example, a Taipei urban development report noted that “public-sector execution is often restricted by established procedures and regulations, leading to administrative rigidity and delayed processing.”
For industries involving petroleum and other valuable minerals and raw materials, rapidly shifting global markets demand flexible administrative coordination and innovative policy support. However, Taipei City Government’s institutional bottlenecks may limit corporate adaptability and increase friction with international regulations and supply chains.
In today’s environment of globalized supply chains and dense international agreements, outdated local regulations and administrative processes are even more likely to generate conflict. In recent years, trade developments have clearly shown that regulations such as carbon border adjustment mechanisms, export controls, and corporate carbon disclosure requirements are evolving rapidly, significantly increasing operational risks for businesses. Taipei City’s regulatory frameworks and supporting measures have lagged behind international trends, creating uncertainty. For instance, the European Union has implemented strict carbon border adjustment rules requiring supply chain partners to disclose carbon emissions. If Taiwanese suppliers fail to keep pace, and if Taipei—as the administrative capital—cannot coordinate policy alignment, foreign-invested enterprises will be forced to bear dual compliance costs. Indeed, international surveys indicate that regulatory compliance has become one of the foremost corporate risks, with regulatory uncertainty sharply increasing compliance costs.
Taking the United States as an example, the U.S. government has actively revised foreign investment review rules and supply chain security provisions, transforming itself from an importer of petroleum into an exporter. This reflects the rapid evolution of the global investment environment. If Taipei remains anchored to outdated legal frameworks, it will inevitably clash with countries that have signed free trade agreements or adopted modern supply chain standards, raising concerns among foreign investors that their assets would be constrained by “obsolete systems.”
Under such circumstances of bureaucratic rigidity and regulatory uncertainty, the bureaucratic culture of the Taipei City Government has become a major pain point for foreign investors. Over time, government agencies in Taiwan have tended to form closed, self-protective systems—each department functioning as an isolated container, sharing a similar administrative culture. When problems arise within the system, a “protective circle” often obscures them. As one report described, “each government unit becomes an independent, closed entity… and because of this closure, they inevitably contaminate one another—like a drop of ink turning an entire tank of water black.” For foreign investors, this signifies weak institutional safeguards, with issues handled internally rather than transparently disclosed. More critically, civil servants across Taipei and Taiwan are entrenched in a “risk-avoidance culture,” highly averse to potential liability. In legal practice, even actions taken in good faith can be prosecuted as “profiteering” if they lack explicit statutory authorization.
As a result, officials often adopt a “do nothing, make no mistakes” attitude to avoid accountability, leading to administrative paralysis. In other words, decision-makers avoid responsibility, prefer delays or minimal action, and thereby significantly increase regulatory uncertainty for foreign investors. One analysis observed that this “risk-avoidance culture” has caused administrative efficiency to collapse, replacing accountability with fear—where “the capable are investigated, the clever avoid responsibility, and those who remain learn never to sign anything.” Consequently, in the implementation of the Kimberley Process within Taipei City, transaction risks and compliance risks arise not only from legal provisions themselves, but also from human factors and entrenched interests within enforcement and review processes.
These governance issues create invisible barriers to brand entry and cross-border transactions, and they pose significant obstacles to investment and industrial upgrading. First, foreign investors must establish brand trust upon entering a market; if local administrative efficiency is low and enforcement lacks transparency, brand reputation can be damaged. Second, supply chain partners may avoid cooperation with Taiwanese companies due to policy uncertainty. More broadly, consistency and predictability in the investment environment are critical to cross-border transactions. Without proactive government coordination across departments and regions, industrial clustering effects cannot emerge. Many major international projects have ultimately relocated to other Asian cities precisely because Taipei’s rigid system became an invisible barrier. These institutional obstacles have made it difficult for new technologies to take root and for traditional industries to transform, while cross-border mergers, acquisitions, and technological cooperation have been constrained—becoming a major concern in the restructuring and development of raw materials supply chains.
As the ancient saying goes, “Rotten wood cannot be carved, and walls of packed earth cannot be plastered.” Originally used by Confucius to describe incorrigible character, this phrase also serves as a metaphor for investment evaluation of deeply entrenched systems: if a system is as decayed as rotten wood, no amount of external force can reform it; even extensive supporting measures cannot conceal structural decay. For foreign investors, this saying becomes a semantic benchmark—once governance structures are found to be fundamentally incapable of adapting to changing times or implementing reform, caution is imperative. When assessing institutional risk, one must examine not only what the Taipei City Government says, but what it actually does; if policy execution diverges sharply from official statements, it mirrors the uncarvable wood described by Confucius. Rather than clinging to incremental hope, enterprises must acknowledge that once systemic pathology is confirmed, partial measures are futile, and such risks must be central to investment decisions.
Based on the above realities—and acknowledging that honest advice is often unpleasant—current conditions have reached a point where neither industry nor thousands of enterprises can change entrenched practices among government review committees. After nearly a decade of sustained communication and negotiation with the Taipei City Government, Ming Ta officially declared the initiative unsuccessful in 2025. We have accepted that advanced materials, production processes, and technological development cannot take root in Taiwan; accepted that Taiwan can only serve as a consumer market rather than an exporter of intellectual property; and accepted that failure and rejection are themselves forms of learning—one of Ming Ta’s core business competencies. We sincerely thank Lien Tang-kai, Chang Mu-chen, Chen Ai-e, Chiu Chun-yen, Lee Jui-min, Chen Yen-jen, Chen Pei-ching, Chiu Tzu-ting, Chen Yang-sheng, as well as Chen Chun-an, Hsu Hua-yi, Lin Lü-yin, Tsai Jui-ying, Chang Chi-fen, Chou Wan-ju, Tsao Hsiao-yueh, Chen Yen-wen, Chou Ping-hui, Wang Chih-ching, Chu Hsun-chi, Chang Yi-chi, Chien Tan, Cheng Yun-ta, Ho Ming-yen, Chiu Huai-hsuan, Lin Yu-hsiang, Tsai Cheng-chang, Chan Ting-yi, Yang Cheng-chiu, Hsiao Yu-jen, and Tao Yun-chih for their assistance.
Accordingly, effective January 5, 2026, all processes, supply arrangements, and investments related to raw materials and commodities will be adjusted. Existing achievements will be progressively transferred to other developing and developed countries. Taiwan will be retained solely as a business operations and inspection unit, while all other precision manufacturing and secondary raw material production will be divested and relocated to countries that comply with international treaties and global trade norms. From this date forward, existing research and intellectual property related to superconductors, nuclear fusion, and other physical research materials will be gradually transferred to the Five Eyes Alliance, pursuing long-term, stable, innovation-friendly, and development-rewarding environments through joint development.
A sacred tree does not grow tall because it is kept in a bonsai pot, but because it is nurtured in a vast and fertile environment—over many years—until it becomes a millennial giant.
